Defence Planning - A Ticking time bomb!

There is something faintly dubious when one reads about a recent report in a reputed publication (Business Standard, Feb 3,2014)  that the armed forces of India have two major problems (a) of every years capital budget , which as we all know is for acquisitions/procurement of weapon systems, hardware & platforms, just 5 percent is earmarked  for  new acquisitions (i.e Rs 2955 crores in FY 14), with the balance going for payments due on account for past years acquisitions & purchases, and  (b) even then, the  forces are just able to spend just 50-60% of that remaining balance capital allocation!

 Just for perspective for readers. The BMC pothole fixing & road maintenance budget for 2014-15 is Rs 2500 crores – nearly as much as the entire Indian Armed Forces capital budget.

Is this not a travesty for one of the worlds most admired professional military, and a favorite Institution of all Indians?

This is what we do in Information Technology (IT) when evaluating a technology. We look at TCO (Total Cost of Ownership) where capex, opex, upgrades, and almost everything (incl ‘known’hidden costs)is itemized, costed and then added up over its life cycle, and then matched off with alternative options. This by and large leads to a fairly correct decision – even with hindsight.

I wonder after decades of procurement and defence planning – basic principles which were ennunciated by Robert McNamara as Defence Secy,USA in the 60’s/70’s  such as Zero based Budgetting (ZBB) and Program,Planning & Budgetting System (PPBS). That these have  been given short shrift in the corridors of Sena Bhavan and South Block?

What is ZBB? Every year the entire budget is reviewed afresh line item wise, without any reference to the past sanctions or outlay. And as if it is a brand new budget, with no memory! It validates therefore whether there are increases or decreases in that particular line item from the last year. And what are the provisions to be made hence in current year – less, more or same.

PPBS – is a tool, which the US DoD uses for long range forecasting, to establish strategic priorities, by costing, tracking expenditures and achievements against this during a budget year or over its long range defense plan. I guess typically, your raising of a mountain strike corp, or carrier battle group (CBG) or new air command (SAC), etc would ideally be matched off with concomitant expenditures and achievements till date, and then prioritised.

So why are we not using these tools, or some Indian jugad variant of it?

The issue is  a cultural one. Armies generally measure their strength with boots on the ground. This is hardwired into their pride and their DNA. So opex is key. Navies and Air Forces are equipment, technology and  hardware intensive – so capex is key. Force projection for these two arms is a multiple of such capital assets, and not how many guys they have on their payroll!

Now you have between these three services lopsided ratios of capex:opex or teeth to tail ratios which are inherent in nature. And cant serve as a common reference point.

So what do we need to do ? Clearly defence planners (IHQ?/COSC/CDS?)  need to reconcile this.

So while an Army marches on its stomach and in their boots. It does not mean that all responses lie in that direction. For e.g the formation of the new Mountain Strike Corps (MSC)  for the China response. What ought to have be done is square off  with alternate plans & strategic options  viz cyber warfare, use of tactical battlefield ‘low yield’ nuke weapons, use of air force elements , long range missiles, satellite imagery, weapons & early warning, blocking off the Mallaca straits with Naval battle groups, getting staging/berthing  rights in Vietnam, Japan for maritime forces, etc, etc.

So for perhaps lesser revenue outlays (which is the pain point of the moment) it may be able to have more effective response while keeping the teeth:tail ratio sharp.